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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the demand and supply of annual and multi-year insurance
contracts with respect to protection against a catastrophic risk, such as a hurricane or
earthquake, in a competitive market. Households are identical with respect to their
exposure to the hazard but with different degrees of risk aversion. They determine
whether or not to purchase an annual or multi-year contract so as to maximize their
expected utility. Insurers who offer annual policies can cancel policies at the end of each
year and change the premium in the following year. Multi-year insurance has a fixed
annual price for each year and no cancellations are permitted at the end of any given year.
The competitive equilibrium consists of a set of prices for a single year and multiyear policy that segments homeowners who are not very risk averse into the noninsurance category. Consumers who are not very risk averse decide not to purchase
insurance. More risk averse individuals demand either single-year or multi-year policies
depending on the premiums charged by insurers and their degree of risk aversion.
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1. Introduction
Insurance policies for property insurance are normally issued as annual contracts even
though they are not precluded from offering coverage for a longer time period. If the risk
of a loss is stable over time, then the insurer should be willing to offer a multi-year policy
with a fixed annual premium reflecting risk. The variance of the losses to the insurer over
time would be reduced in much the same way that an increase in the number of insured
individuals reduces the variance. In this sense, offering a policy for more than one year is
another form of risk diversification.
The insurer who offers a multi-year policy at a fixed premium per year is restricted by
not being able to either raise the premium and/or cancel policies if it suffers a very large
loss that reduces its surplus significantly. This feature is similar to guaranteed renewable
policy with locked premiums for health insurance (Pauly, Kunreuther, and Hirth, 1995,
Frick, 1998, Pauly, Kunreuther, Menzel, and Hirth, 2011). On the other hand, the
administrative cost of marketing a policy is lower for a multi-year policy than for annual
contracts that have to be renewed each year. A multi-year policy is attractive to a risk
averse consumer because the premium is stable over time. Furthermore, the consumer
knows that it will not have to incur search costs in finding another insurer if its policy is
canceled that has occurred historically when major catastrophes cause insurers to adjust
their underwriting criteria.
This paper examines from a theoretical perspective the relative attractiveness of
multi-year policies and annual policies to insurers and to households facing a given risk
in a competitive insurance market. We are particularly interested in pursuing this line of
research because individuals are likely to find multi-year property insurance attractive
relative to annual policies. Adding fixed-price multi-year property insurance policies to
the menu of contracts offered by insurers should also lead to an increase in the demand
for coverage.
Empirical evidence supporting these points comes from a web-based controlled
experiment played for real money where individuals had the option of purchasing 1-year
or 2-year insurance contracts to protect their property against damage from a hurricane
With respect to the 1-year policy, the price would increase in year 2 if a hurricane
occurred in year 1 to reflect an updating of the probability of a disaster occurring in the
following year. The premium for a 2-year contract was kept stable over time; however,
the insurer charged a higher premium than for an annual policy offered in year 1 because
it could not increase its premium in year 2 if a hurricane occurred in the previous year.
The data reveal that when insurers offer individuals 1-year policies at an actuarially
fair rate, approximately 62% of the subjects purchase insurance. When the same 1-year
contract is offered along with a 2-year contract that has a loading cost of 5%, the demand
for insurance increases to 73%---a statistically significant difference. Over 60% of those
demand insurance preferred the 2-year policy even though its expected cost was 5%
higher than buying two annual policies (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2012).
In practice, insurers do offer multi-year contracts for life insurance where the losses
are normally independent of each other. Term-life policies are typically offered with
premiums “locked in” for five to ten years; buyers can choose whether they want to pay
extra for such guarantees over annual contracts knowing that they may drop coverage at
2

any time. Policyholders are then certain what their life insurance premiums will be over
the next five or ten years, regardless of what happens to their health or the overall
mortality rate of their insurer’s portfolio.
Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) examine 150 term life insurance contracts, some of which
have fixed premiums for 5, 10 or 20 years while others are 1-year renewable policies.
They show that on average the extra prepayment of premiums to protect consumers
against being reclassified into a higher risk category for a fixed period of time is more
costly over the total period of coverage than a series of annual term policies that can be
renewed but where premiums may fluctuate from year to year. Still, people buy those
multi-year fixed-price life insurance policies, indicating that they view the stability of
premiums as an important attribute in their utility function and are willing to pay more
for it.
An important difference between property and life coverage is that insurers are
concerned about catastrophic losses to property due to natural disasters such as hurricanes
and earthquakes. They thus have to reserve capital in to protect themselves against these
extreme events. There is an opportunity cost to them of being forced to keep this capital
in relatively liquid form rather than investing the money in securities that earn a higher
expected return.
On the demand side, consumers may want to purchase multi-year property insurance
policies is to avoid the search costs of looking for another insurer should their annual
policy be canceled. After the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons many insurers did not
renew coverage for a significant number of homeowners in the Gulf Coast (Klein 2007).
While most of those residents were able to find coverage with other insurers, they
typically had to pay a higher price than prior to these disasters and they were required to
have a higher deductible (Vitelo, 2007). Others obtained coverage from state insurance
pools, which grew significantly after the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons (Grace and
Klein, 2009).
Multi-year property insurance contracts can also improve social welfare by increasing
the number of individuals whose homes are insured prior to a disaster. They will receive
claim payments to restore property damaged from a hurricane or flood and have less need
for federal disaster assistance. The cost to the general taxpayer is thus reduced.
In this regard, the number of uninsured homes facing losses from natural disasters is
significant. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) revealed that 41%
of damaged homes from the 2005 hurricanes were uninsured or underinsured. Of the
60,196 owner-occupied homes with severe wind damage from these hurricanes, 23,000
did not have insurance against wind loss (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007).
With respect to risks from flooding, Kriesel and Landry (2004) and Dixon et al. (2006)
found that only about half of the homes in high-risk areas had flood insurance. In
California, despite the well-recognized risk of earthquakes, only 12% of homeowners in
the state had coverage against earthquake damage at the end of 2010 (California
Department of Insurance, 2011).
A principal reason for this lack of coverage is that many residents purchase coverage
only after a disaster occurs and then allow their annual policy to lapse. Flood insurance in
the U.S. provided by the federally run National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) since its
3

creation in 1968 highlights this point. Brown and Hoyt (2000) analyzed data from the
NFIP between 1983 and 1993 found that flood insurance purchases were highly
correlated with flood losses in the previous year. A recent analysis of all new policies
issued by the NFIP from January 1, 2001 to 31 December 2009 revealed that the median
length of time before these policies lapsed is 3 to 4 years. On average, only 74% of new
policies were still in force 1 year after they were purchased; after 5 years, only 36% were
still in place. The lapse rate is still high after correcting for migration and does not vary
much across flood zones (Michel-Kerjan et. al. in press).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models the multi-period insurance
problem and develops conditions for determining a competitive equilibrium. Section 3
analyzes the case where the loss distribution facing each homeowner is Gaussian and
where homeowner’s risk preferences are of the CARA form using an exponential utility
function. Section 4 provides illustrative examples based on the Gaussian distribution and
CARA utility function to show how the demand for annual and multi-year insurance
contracts is impacted by changes in the costs affecting the price of insurance and the
correlation between risks. Section 5 summarizes the paper and suggests directions for
future research.
2. Modeling Multi-period Insurance
We consider an insurance market operating over two periods to cover a set of
households exposed to a common catastrophic risk such as earthquake or hurricane risk.
The insurance market is assumed to be competitive with free entry and exit, but subject to
solvency regulation. Risk bearing capital is obtained from premium income and
reinsurance. The price of reinsurance in period 1 is known, but the price in period 2 is
uncertain, and is specified by a binary random variable with a specified increase or
decrease relative to the price in period 1 which depends on whether
Two types of products, single-period policies and multi-period policies, compete for
consumer demand for insurance. Homeowners can purchase either no insurance, singleyear policies in one or both periods, or a multi-year policy purchased at the beginning of
the first period and covering both periods. The competitive insurance price is determined
so that it covers expected losses, marketing and operating expenses, plus the cost of risk
capital necessary to provide protection against insolvency, where the level of the required
capital is determined exogenously by the insurance regulator.
We assume that households are identical in terms of their exposure to the hazard, but
with some correlation in the losses, such as would be the case if a natural disaster
damaged a number of insured homes. Denote the set of potential homeowners in the
market by A. Homeowners are assumed to be risk averse with a ∈ A being a scalar index
of risk aversion and with two–period separable risk preferences given by
V(x1 , x2 , a) = U x1 , a + U x2 , a

(1)

where U(x, a) is concave increasing in x, and x1 and x2 are monetary outcomes in periods
1 and 2. Note that for simplicity we neglect discounting of utility in period 2. While A
represents the set of potential homeowners, the actual distribution of homeowner risk
aversion will be specified by the counting function defined for any a ∈ A by
4

G a = Number of Homeowners with risk aversion less than or equal to "a".
To illustrate, suppose the number of homeowners is 100 of which 40 have a = 0.1 and 60
have a=0.2. Then, G(a)=0 for a < 0.1, G(a)=40 for 0.1 ≤ a < 0.2, G(a) = 100 for a ≥ 0.2.
We make the following assumptions concerning the hazard and the policies offered in
the insurance market to homeowners.
A1. Only full insurance is offered and each household a ∈ A faces the same
annual/period risk X(a) of loss, distributed according to the generic cdf
F0 (x, μ, σ, ρ), with mean E X(a) = μ and variance VAR X(a) = σ2 , where ρ ≥ 0
is a scalar index which is intended to measure the extent to which the loss
distribution for a book of business (BoB) made up of properties from the set A is
fat-tailed. The loss distribution is assumed to be identical for both periods, and
statistically independent between the periods.
The impact of the index ρ will be specified below; it may be thought of as an index of the
cost of reinsurance cover for a BoB made up of properties from the set A. We use ρ to
model the impact of correlated losses on standard reinsurance pricing models with
constant or increasing loading factors. The reinsurance will be an Excess of Loss (XoL)
contract with fixed upper and lower limits designated as L1 n , and L2 n respectively.
A2. Firms offering single-year (SY) policies may cancel any policy at the end of the
first period in response to increased cost of risk capital that leads them to want to
reduce their BoB. Homeowners are aware of this possibility and assume that
there is a probability q ∈ (0, 1) of cancellation, with an ensuing transaction cost
of τ ≥ 0 to search for new coverage alternatives for period 2 if their policy is
canceled.
2.1 Demand for Single-Year (SY) and Multi-Year (MY) Policies
Homeowners face the choice of purchasing either two single-year policies or a multipolicy to cover the risks they face over the two–period horizon of interest. Of course,
they may also elect to buy no insurance (NI) in one or both periods. At the beginning of
period one, homeowners must either choose an MY policy covering both periods, or they
must plan on some other sequence of SY policies or NI decisions. In doing so, we assume
that homeowners have complete information on the prices they will face.
A3: Homeowners know the prices for all policies in all states of the world at the
beginning of period 1. For the MY policy, the price per period price PM is
constant over both periods. For the SY policy, price in the first period is denoted
PS1, and the state-contingent price in the second period is denoted Pw
S2 , where
w ∈ d, u reflects the state of the world in terms of reinsurance/capital costs with
probability of state d = φ ∈ [0,1] and probability of state u = 1-φ. The
consequences of these alternative states for the insurer are described below, but
their general import is that the cost of reinsurance in period 2 will decrease in
state d and increase in state u relative to period 1.
At the beginning of period 1, there are three alternatives available to a homeowner:
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i) Purchase an SY policy for period 1, at price PS1, possibly facing cancellation of this
policy at the end of period 1, with probability q and with resulting transactions
costs τ.
ii) Purchase an MY policy at price per period of PM covering both periods 1 and 2.
iii) Purchase No Insurance (NI).
At the beginning of period 2, after the state of the world w ∈ d, u is known, a
homeowner faces the following choices (see Figure 1):
i) If the homeowner chose either an SY policy or NI in period 1, then the homeowner
can either choose NI or purchase an SY policy for period 2 at price Pw
S2 where the
d
u
price can either decrease to PS2 or increase to PS2 depending on reinsurance capital
costs.
ii) The homeowner who chose an MY policy in period 1 can continue to be covered
under this MY policy or can cancel it with a cancellation fee ψ ≥ 0. The
cancellation fee is set by the insurer so that it breaks even at the end of period 2. If
there were no cancellation costs associated with an MY policy, then all
homeowners will want to switch to an SY policy if the following two conditions
hold:


the price of an SY policy decreased in period 2 so it was less than PM; and



the price differential between the MY and SY policy is greater than the
transaction cost τ of purchasing a new policy.

In this case, the MY insurer would only offer coverage in the state of the world
w = u. As we show in the Appendix, PM is less than the MY insurer’s average cost
at w = u, so that the MY insurer would suffer a loss in the process. It will have
priced its policy under the assumption that it would recover its costs from
revenues generated in both periods, but could not recoup these costs (some of
which will be sunk in period 1) because its policyholders abandoned ship at the
end of period 1. Hence, for MY insurance to be viable, the cancellation fee ψ
imposed by the MY insurer has to satisfy: ψ PM -Pds2 -τ.5 In this case, all
homeowners would maintain their MY policy in period 2.
For our benchmark analysis in this paper, we assume, per A3, that homeowners are
perfectly informed about prices and the probability distribution on the states of the world
w ∈ {d, u}, i.e., they know φ. We assume that their beliefs about the cancellation
probability q are fixed and independent of the actual BoB changes by insurers.6 Figure 1
shows the relevant choices for a homeowner in period 2.

Our numerical examples show for typical values of insurance cost that the lower bound PM -Pds2 -τ on the
cancelation fee ψ will be only a small percentage of the MY premium. Indeed, the lower bound may even
be negative if the MY insurer has significant marketing cost advantages and/or if τ is sufficiently large.
6
Of course, q could be adjusted in rational expectation fashion so that it reflected the equilibrium outcomes
of SY insurers between periods 1 and 2.
5
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Figure 1: Homeowner’s Choice Problem in Period 2

Given our assumption that homeowners will not cancel MY policies in period 2, the
state-dependent insurance decision I2 (a, w) of homeowner a ∈ A, w ∈ {d, u} at the
beginning of period 2 will be the following:
D2-i)

I2 a, w = MY if I1 a = MY, with resulting period 2 utility of U(-PM ,a)

D2-ii)

w
I2 a, w = SYw
2 if I1 a ≠ MY and U(-PS2 ,a) ≥ U(CE(NI, a), a) with
resulting period 2 utility of U(-Pw
S2 , a)

D2-iii)

I2 a,w = NI if I1 a ≠ MY and U(-Pw
S2 ,a) < U(CE(NI, a), a) with resulting
period 2 utility of U(CE(NI, a), a)

where the certainty equivalents (CEs) of the various policies offered, MY and
w
SYw
{d, u}, are CE MY = -PM and CE SYw
2,w
2 = -PS2 . The CE NI, a is
characterized by U(CE(NI, a), a) = E{U(-X(a), a)}.7
The above three conditions can be interpreted in the following manner. A homeowner
will have an MY policy in period 2 only if he purchased an MY policy in period 1 (D2-i).
A homeowner will purchase an SY policy in period 2 if he did not purchase an MY
policy in period 1 and is sufficiently risk averse so that the utility of having full insurance
is greater than the expected utility of having no insurance in period 2. (D2-ii). He will be
in state NI if the expected utility of having no insurance in period 2 exceeds the utility of
SY(D2-iii).
Demand in period 2 [D2 z, w ] for the policy options Z2 = {MY, SYw
2 , NI} follows
directly from the above. Let ∆2 z, a, w = 1 if I2 a, w = z and ∆2 z, a, w =0 otherwise,
where z ∈ {MY, SYw
2 , NI}. Then,
w
D 2 (z, w)    2 (z, a, w)dG(a) , z ∈ {MY, SY2 , NI}.

(2)

A

Equation (2) just allocates homeowners in period 2 to an MY, SY or NI policy as a
function of their degree of risk aversion and whether the reinsurance/capital costs are in
state d or u.
7

For convenience, we suppress explicit dependence of certainty equivalents on initial wealth levels W(a).
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Turning to period 1, recall that an SY insurer can cancel a policy at the end of period
1, and that homeowners believe this will occur with probability q and result in
transactions costs τ. Then the certainty equivalent CE(SY1 ,a) of a first-period SY policy
is characterized by
U CE SY1 , a , a = qU - PS1 + τ , a +(1-q)U(-PS1 , a).

(3)

Equation (3) indicates that higher values of q reduces the attractiveness of an SY policy
because the homeowner is more likely to have her policy canceled and will have to incur
a search cost τ to find an insurer who will be willing to sell her a policy in period 2.
The optimal period 1 decision (note that we ignore discounting) is then determined
through dynamic programming as follows. First, define the expected utilities V1 (z)
associated with choosing each of the options z ∈ Z1 = {MY, SY1 , NI} in period 1 and the
optimal state-dependent choice following this in period 2. Then
V1 MY, a = 2U -PM , a

(4)

V1 SY1 , a = U(CE(SY1 , a), a)
+ φMax[U(-PdS2 , a),U(CE NI, a , a)] + 1-φ Max[U(-PuS2 , a), U(CE(NI, a), a)] (5)
V1 NI, a = U CE NI, a , a
+ φMax[U(-PdS2 , a),U(CE NI, a , a)] + 1-φ Max[U(-PuS2 , a), U(CE(NI, a), a)] (6)
where, in view of the possibility of cancellation of the SY policy at the end of period 1,
the period 1 expected utility of choosing an SY policy is given by (3).
Equation (4) states that a homeowner who purchases MY insurance in period 1 will
continue to be insured by the same policy in period 2. Equation (5) states that a
homeowner who purchases SY insurance in period 1 incurs the immediate cost of the
premium PS1 and, with probability q, may incur an additional transactions cost τ if the
policy is canceled at the end of period 1, as reflected in the CE of SY1 given in (3). This
same homeowner has the option of buying a second SY policy in period 2 or NI, and will
choose the best of these two options in each state of the world w ∈ {d, u}. Equation (6)
states that a homeowner choosing NI in period 1 can choose purchase an SY policy in
period 2 or remain uninsured (NI) and will choose the best of these options in each state
of the world w ∈ {d, u}.
The optimal first-period choice for homeowner a ∈ A is then given by
I1 a = ArgMaxz [V1 z, a | z ∈ Z1 = MY, SY1 , NI ].

(7)

The demand in period 1[D1 z for the policy options Z1 = {MY, SY1 , NI} follow
directly from the above. Let ∆1 z, a = 1 if I1 a = z and ∆1 z, a = 0 otherwise, where
z ∈ {MY, SY , NI}. Then,

8

D1 (z)   1 (z, a)dG(a) , z ∈ {MY, SY , NI}.
A

(8)

The above characterization of demand for MY and SY policies is general. Final
demands for these policies in both periods depend on the distribution of homeowner risk
preferences as reflected in their degree of risk aversion characterized by G(a). It also of
course depends on the loss distribution X. In section 3 below we consider the special case
where per period losses X are normally distributed and the risk preferences of
homeowners are of the CARA form, U x,a = -e-ax .
2.2 Supply and Pricing of Insurance
We assume a competitive insurance market which consists of two types of firms,
those offering SY policies and those offering MY policies. Firms offering SY policies
can adjust the size of their BoB at the end of period 1 in response to changes in the cost
of reinsurance (i.e. in response to the realized state of the world w ∈ {d, u}) . In a
competitive equilibrium, the size of the insurer’s BoB is determined by the minimum of
the average cost curve for the insurer. SY insurers will therefore cancel some policies at
the end of period 1 in the state of the world in which reinsurance rates increase from
period 1 to period 2 and will expand their BoB when reinsurance rates decrease. MY
insurers do not have this option and must provide coverage in both periods to all
homeowners to whom they issued policies in period 1.
Reinsurance costs are assumed to depend on the non-negative scalar index ρ > 0,
which may be thought of as an index of the fat-tailed nature of the distribution of a BoB
of size n from the set A (see A1). A more specific model for reinsurance pricing is
discussed in section 4. The following assumption summarizes the relationship of the
regulated solvency risk level and reinsurance costs for insurers.
A4. Insurers are required to satisfy a regulatory solvency constraint.8 It requires for
each period their combined premium revenue plus reinsurance be sufficiently
large to pay all claims with a probability of at least 1 - γ* .
This regulatory solvency constraint is similar to a safety first model that insurers
often utilize to determine the optimal BoB and pricing decisions. It was first proposed by
Roy (1952), examined in the context of the theory of the firm and profit maximization by
Day, Aigner and Smith (1971) and applied to insurance by Stone (1973a and 1973b).
Following the series of natural disasters that occurred at the end of the 1980s and in the
1990s, many insurers focused on the solvency constraint to determine the maximum
amount of catastrophe coverage they were willing to provide. More specifically they
were concerned that their aggregate exposure to a particular risk not exceed a certain
level. Today rating agencies, such as A.M. Best, focus on insurers’ exposure to
catastrophic losses as one element in determining credit ratings, another reason for
insurers to focus on the solvency constraint (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2011).

8

We do not analyze the costs of insolvency here, but rather assume that any insolvencies are paid for by an
independent mechanism that does not affect the supply and demand decisions modeled here.
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For simplicity, we assume that insurers with a BoB of size n meet their solvency
constraint by purchasing XoL reinsurance with limits L1 n , L2 n , with L1 n = nμ (the
expected loss cost for a BoB of size n) and L2 n set to meet the solvency constraint.
Consider an insurer with BoB = {a1, a2, …, an} and the associated total loss distribution
X n = ∑ni=1 X(ai ), with cdf F L; X n . Then, L2 n is characterized by9
γ* =1-F L2 (n);X n

= Prob{X n >L2 (n)}.

Figure 2 illustrates the above assumption on reinsurance attachment points and the
solvency constraint. Reinsurance contracts are on a per period basis, corresponding also
to the solvency constraints that are required to be fulfilled in each period.
Figure 2: Illustrating reinsurance attachment points under assumption A4

The costs to insurers of providing coverage encompass administrative and selling
expenses, loss costs and reinsurance costs, and depend on the size of the BoB (n).
Formally, the expected total costs per period for SY and MY policies are given as:
CSY n;r,ζ =C0 n +Cm n +μn+Cs (n;r, μ, σ, ρ)

(9)

CMY n;r,ζ =C0 n +νCm n +μn+Cs (n;r, μ, σ, ρ)

(10)

9

In the insurance literature, the negative cdf 1-F L;X n is referred to as the exceedance probability (EP)
curve. It is fundamental in reinsurance calculations since expected losses between any two attachment
points can be calculated as the area under the EP curve between these attachment points. See Grossi and
Kunreuther (2005) for details.
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where the vector of parameter values is given by ζ = (μ, σ, ρ, γ* , φ, q, τ) and where the
elements of total expected cost are: C0 n represents administrative and selling expenses;
Cm n represents marketing expenses; μn are total expected losses; and Cs (n;r, μ, σ, ρ)
represents reinsurance cost. Note that, with the exception of marketing costs, all of the
elements of total expected cost are identical for SY and MY insurers. Concerning
marketing costs, it is assumed that ν ∈ (0, 1] so that these per period marketing costs are
likely to be less for an MY insurer since its policyholders in the second period are locked
in as a result of first period choices. Thus, if SY and MY insurers were to choose the
same BoB “n” in both periods, and if v = 1, then both insurers would have identical total
expected cost. However, SY insurers can adjust their BoB from period to period in
response to changes in reinsurance costs, while the MY insurer is constrained to offer the
same BoB in both periods. Thus, SY and MY insurers will in general face different total
expected costs because of potential marketing cost advantages for the MY insurer and
potential flexibility advantages of the SY insurer in responding to changing reinsurance
costs.
Reinsurance costs are net of expected payoffs from reinsurance contracts, which are
all of the XoL variety. In other words, the reinsurance cost reflects the additional
premium above the expected loss paid by the insurer to the reinsurer for protection
against a portion of the loss between the attachment points of the XoL contract. We
assume that the average underwriting costs [C0 (n)/n] are convex and decreasing as n
increases to reflect the spreading of fixed costs over more policies. The average
marketing costs [Cm n /n] are convex and increasing in n, representing the higher
marginal cost of marketing as the insurance territory increases. Losses to the insurer have
a mean μ and standard deviation σ. Average reinsurance costs [Cs (n;r, μ, σ, ρ)/n] are
convex in n and are dependent on whether the reinsurer is in state d or u so that
r = r w , w ∈ d, u . These costs are also assumed to be increasing in ρ (the fat-tail index)
reflecting the need for the reinsurer to hold higher reserves due to an increased
probability of experiencing large losses.
The Appendix, Part 1, specifies the derivation of the average costs and the
equilibrium conditions in a competitive market. Competitive equilibrium in both the SY
and MY markets occurs where insurers of each type select a BoB that minimizes their
average cost, CSY n;r,ζ /n, CMY n;r,ζ /n, with price given by the minimum of the
respective average cost curve. The assumptions concerning the elements of average costs
discussed in the Appendix, Part 1, assure the existence of the equilibrium for both SY and
MY markets. These assumptions also imply a number of intuitively appealing results for
the comparative statics of equilibrium prices and BoBs for both MY and SY insurers. For
example, since reinsurance costs in period 2 increase (u) or decrease (d) relative to period
1, depending on the state of the world, w ∈ d,u , equilibrium prices in the SY market
satisfy: PdS2 < PS1 < PuS2 and the corresponding optimal BoBs satisfy: ndS2 > nS1 > nuS2 . Also,
the average costs of the MY insurer satisfy: ACdM2 < PM < ACuM2 so that the MY insurer
has positive profits in state w = d and losses in state w = u.10
10

In particular, as argued earlier, the cancelation fee needs to satisfy: ψ PM -Pds2 -τ in order to assure
that the MY insurer will have viable operations in both the profitable state of the world w = d as well as the
unprofitable state of the world w = u.
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The model proposed here suggests a number of trade-offs on both the demand and the
supply side in evaluating the survival and efficiency of MY vs SY policies in competitive
equilibrium. On the demand side, MY policies offer a constant price over both periods
and therefore are attractive to risk-averse homeowners in avoiding intertemporal price
volatility. MY policies also protect homeowners from the transactions costs of policy
cancellation (represented by the parameters q, τ above) associated with changes in the
equilibrium BoB for SY insurers between periods 1 and 2 that result from changes in the
cost of capital and reinsurance.
On the supply side, there may be marketing and policy service cost savings associated
with MY policies. However, MY policies expose the insurer to increased risk of
reinsurance cost volatility, since the MY insurer cannot adjust his BoB in response to the
realized state of the world w ∈ d,u in contrast to the SY insurer. The ultimate outcome
in terms of equilibrium prices and demands for MY vs SY policies is an empirical matter
depending on which of these trade-offs dominates and on the risk preferences of
homeowners. The results in the next sections illustrate this for the case of Gaussian loss
distributions and CARA preferences.
3. The Case of Gaussian Losses and CARA Preferences
This section describes the case where X, the generic loss distribution facing each
homeowner, is Gaussian N(μ, σ2 ) and where homeowner risk preferences are of the
CARA form: U x, a = -e-ax , where a > 0, i.e A =
, the positive reals. We further
assume that there is a non-negative correlation ρ ∈ 0, 1 between the loss distributions
facing two homeowners X(a) and X(b), identical for all a, b ∈ A (a ≠ b). Thus, an insurer
with a BoB of n homes would face an annual loss distribution with mean nμ and variance
σ2 [n+n n-1 ρ]. These assumptions allow certainty equivalents (CEs) for the demand
equations to be computed easily. Reinsurance costs for this case can be also readily
computed for Excess of Loss (XoL) contracts with fixed limits L1 n , L2 n , and linearly
increasing loading factors. These costs can be shown to satisfy all of the assumptions
detailed in the Appendix Part 1, including increasing costs as ρ increases.
Equilibrium prices under competition are determined by (T1) and (T2) as shown in
the Appendix. These determine, for any given cost functions and reinsurance market
conditions, the price vector {PM , PS1 , PdS2 , PuS2 }. This price vector and the parameter
vector ζ = (μ, σ, ρ, γ* , φ, q, τ) are assumed to be common knowledge for both insurers
and homeowners. We calculate demand for each homeowner a ∈ A from the demand
equations (2)-(8), obtaining market demand by aggregation over G(a).
Note that, given the Gaussian and CARA assumptions, the Certainty Equivalent (CE)
of No Insurance (NI) for homeowner a ∈ A in either period 1 or 2 is given by:
aσ2

CE(NI, a) = (μ+ ). Thus, conditions D2-i) – D2-iii) translate into the following
2
decision rules for determining period 2 demand for homeowner a ∈ A:
D2N-i)

I2 a, w = MY if I1 a = MY, with resulting period 2 utility of U(-PM ,a)
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D2N-ii)

If I1 a ≠ MY, then I2 a,w = NI or SY whichever yields the maximum
expected utility with a resulting period 2 utility of
Max{U -Pw
S2 , a , U CE NI, a , a }.

Period 1 demand for a ∈ A is then specified by (4)-(6) which are summarized as
follows:
D1N-i)

I1 a = MY if V1 MY, a = 2U -PM , a ≥ Max{V1 SY, a , V1 NI, a };

D1N-ii)

Else I1 a = SY or NI, whichever gives the highest period 1 expected
utility V1 NI, a , V1 SY, a as given in (5)–(6), noting from (7) that the
CE of purchasing SY insurance in period 1 is
1
CE(SY1 , a) = - log L(a, ζ) eaPS1 , with L(a, ζ) = qeaτ +(1-q).
a

The consequences of the above rules for period 2 choices are summarized as follows.
A homeowner who chose an MY policy in period 1 will continue it in period 2. A
homeowner who chose either NI or SY policy in period 1 will choose the option, NI or
SY that has a higher expected utility. This gives rise to two critical cutoff values of
homeowner risk preferences, ad2 and au2 , which are the cut off values for NI vs SY choices
in period 2 given the state of the world w ∈ {d, u} so that:
w
U CE NI, a , a = Max{U -Pw
S2 , a ,U CE NI, a , a } for a < a2

(11)
w
w
U -Pw
S2 , a = Max{U -PS2 , a ,U CE NI, a , a } for a ≥ a2 .
1

2
The comparisons in (11) are equivalent to determining when Pw
S2 > or ≤ μ+ aσ , where

the cutoff values are therefore given by:
PdS2 < PuS2 , it follows that ad2 < au2 .

2(Pw
S2 -μ)
aw
=
2
σ2

2

, w ∈ {u, d}. Since, as noted above,

The cutoff values in Period 2 indicate that consumers who are more risk averse will
want to purchase an SY policy in period 1. Furthermore if the price of insurance is lower
because the insurer is in the d rather than u state, consumers who are less risk averse will
still be willing to purchase insurance (i.e. ad2 < au2 ).
Given the period 2 choice, the optimal choice in period 1 is specified by D1N-i) D1N-ii). To characterize this solution, define the critical threshold risk aversion
a(PS1 ) ∈ A as the solution to V1 NI, a
V1 SY1 , a . In the Appendix Part 2, a(PS1 ) is
shown to exist and be unique. As we will see below, homeowners with risk aversion
a < a(PS1 ) will prefer NI to SY in period 1 and homeowners with risk aversion a > a(PS1 )
will prefer SY to NI in period 1 (if these were the only choices available). From the
definition of V1 NI, a , V1 SY1 , a (see (5) and (6), we see that period 2 payoffs from
choosing NI or SY in period 1 are identical. so that a(PS1 ) is the solution to
U(CE(NI, a), a) = U(CE(SY1 , a), a). This is equivalent to CE(NI1 , a) = CE(SY1 , a).
For the CARA/Gaussian this yields the following identity characterizing a(PS1 ):
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1
1
a(PS1 ) : μ+ aσ2 = log L(a, ζ) eaPS1 .
2
a

(12)

Similarly, define the functions H1 a, NI-MY , respectively H1 a, SY-MY , as the
value of PM for which V1 NI, a =V1 MY,a , respectively V1 SY1 , a =V1 MY, a . From
(4)-(6), these functions are characterized by:
H1 a, NI-MY : 2U -PM ,a = U CE NI, a , a + φMax[U(-Pd , a),U(CE NI, a , a)]
S2
+ 1-φ Max[U(-PuS2 , a),U(CE(NI, a), a)];

(13)

H1 a, SY-MY : 2U -PM ,a = U CE SY1 , a , a + φMax[U(-Pd , a),U(CE NI, a , a)]
S2
u

+ 1-φ Max[U(-PS2 , a),U(CE(NI, a), a)] .

(14)

In the Appendix, Part 2, we show that there is a unique solution PM to (13)-(14) for every
a ∈ A so that these functions are well defined. We also show that both functions are
increasing in a ∈ A. Intuitively, this reflects the fact that as homeowners become more
risk averse, they are prepared to pay a higher premium PM for an MY contract. They
prefer this multi-period contract over the alternatives for the following reasons:
 Avoiding the risks of suffering a large loss from not being insured (NI)
 Having their policy cancelled or paying a higher premium in period 2 if they
purchased an SY policy in period 1.
Using the above functions (12)-(14), we can summarize the solution to the two-period
dynamic programming problem characterizing the optimal choice for homeowner a ∈ A
in period 1 as shown in Figure 3. This figure shows for arbitrary but fixed values of the
prices PS1 , PdS2 , PuS2 , the optimal period 1 demand response for homeowners as PM varies.
Of course, PM is also fixed at its equilibrium value (see (T2) in the Appendix), but one
can think of this figure as illustrating alternative demand outcomes as the MY
equilibrium price PM varies, driven by the underlying costs in (10).
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Figure 3. Period 1 Demand for NI, SY, MY
H1(a, NI-MY)

The logic of Figure 3 is as follows. Each of the functions in (12)-(14) separates the set
of homeowners A into two subsets for each of the three sets of binary choices {NI, SY},
{NI, MY}, {SY, MY} into those who prefer the first of these binary choices and those
who prefer the second. Thus, in evaluating the two choices NI and SY in period 1, any
homeowner a < a(PS1 ) prefers NI to SY and in any a > a(PS1 ) prefers SY to NI. Similarly,
in evaluating the two choices NI and MY in period 1, any homeowner a ∈ A such that
PM > H1 a, NI-MY prefers NI to MY and prefers MY to NI if PM < H1 a, NI-MY .
Finally, in evaluating the two choices SY and MY in period 1, any homeowner a ∈ A
such that PM > H1 a, SY-MY prefers SY to MY and prefers MY to SY if
PM < H1 a, SY-MY . This leads to a complete determination f consumer demand for any
equilibrium price vector P = {PM , PS1 , PdS2 , PuS2 }.
The six values of Θi i=1…6 in Figure 3 illustrate how one determines the optimal
policy choice for homeowners in period 1.


Consider the (a, PM ) pair Θ1 Given its location relative to the three binary choice
curves, homeowner a(Θ1 ) prefers MY to SY, SY to NI and MY to NI: so that this
homeowner’s optimal period 1 choice at price PM (Θ1 ) is MY as shown.



For the Θ2 pair, homeowner a(Θ2 ) prefers SY to MY, SY to NI and MY to NI: so
that this homeowner’s optimal period 1 choice at price PM (Θ2 ) is SY as shown.



For the Θ3 pair, homeowner a(Θ3 ) prefers SY to MY, SY to NI and MY to NI: so
that this homeowner’s optimal period 1 choice at price PM (Θ2 ) is SY as shown.
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For the Θ3 pair, homeowner a(Θ3 ) prefers SY to MY, SY to NI and MY to NI: so
that this homeowner’s optimal period 1 choice at price PM (Θ3 ) is SY as shown.



For the Θ4 pair, homeowner a(Θ4 ) prefers NI to MY, NI to SY and SY to MY: so
that this homeowner’s optimal period 1 choice at price PM (Θ4 ) is NI.



For the Θ5 pair, homeowner a(Θ5 ) prefers NI to MY, NI to SY and MY to SY: so
that this homeowner’s optimal period 1 choice at price PM (Θ5 ) is NI.



For the Θ6 pair, homeowner a(Θ6 ) prefers MY to NI, NI to SY, and MY to SY: so
that this homeowner’s optimal period 1 choice at price PM (Θ6 ) is MY.

All that is required to produce consistent preferences is that the intersection point
Θ of H1 a, NI-MY and H1 a, SY-MY occur at a(PS1 . This follows directly from the
fact that V1 MY, a = V1 NI, a on H1 a, NI-MY and V1 MY, a = V1 SY1 , a on
H1 a, SY-MY , so that, at the intersection Θ* , V1 NI, a = V1 SY1 , a . Since a(PS1 is
the unique solution to (12), all three of the binary choice functions must intersect at the
same point Θ* .
*

The logic of Figure 3 determines period 1 demand for any homeowner a ∈ A.
Aggregate demand for each policy type (NI, SY, MY) is then determined by the
distribution G(a) of homeowner risk aversion in the population. A typical distribution
function G(a) is shown in Figure 3. With period 1 choices determined as above, period 2
choices follow directly from D2N-i) - D2N-ii) following the logic of Figure 1. More
specifically, if a homeowner bought an MY policy in period 1 then she will continue to
have this policy in period 2. If the homeowner did not buy an MY policy in period 1, then
she will decide to either buy an SY policy in period 2 or be uninsured (NI) depending on
on whether reinsurance costs increase (u) or decrease (d) relative to period 1. Thus, the
CARA/Gaussian case is completely solved.
To summarize, the price vector P = {PM , PS1 , PdS2 , PuS2 } is determined for the SY and
MY markets from the conditions defining competitive equilibrium in these markets, as
characterized by (T1)-(T2) in Appendix, Part 1. We define the critical values of risk
aversion aNM and aSM as the unique solutions to:
PM = H1 aNM , NI-MY ; PM = H1 aSM , SY-MY .
We thus have the following critical values with respect to risk aversion in
determining the option in period 1 which maximizes the homeowner’s expected utility
when only two alternatives are available:


aNM when only NI and MY are available to the homeowner.



aSM when only SY and MY are available to the homeowner.



a(PS1 ) when only NI and SY are available to the homeowner.

Given these critical values determining all possible binary choices, demand is then
determined as follows:
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i)

There is a region from a = 0 to some aNI (P) = min{a(PS1 ), aNM }, such that
homeowners with a < aNI (P) all choose NI in period 1 (in period 2 they choose
the best of the two options of SY or NI depending on the state-dependent prices
that obtain).

ii)

Defining aSY P = Max{aSM , a(PS1 )}, there is a region, possibly empty,
between a(PS1 ) and aSY P , such that homeowners with a ∈ [a(PS1 ), aSY P ]
choose SY in period 1 (in period 2 they choose the best of the two options of SY
or NI depending on the state-dependent prices that obtain).

iii)

Homeowners with a ≥ max{aNI (P), aSM } all choose MY in period 1 (and they
stick with this in period 2).

Total market demand is then determined by (2) and (8), by integrating over the
distribution G(a) of homeowner risk preferences. We thus have a complete solution to the
CARA/Gaussian case.
4. Illustrative Examples for the CARA/Gaussian Case
This section provides some numerical examples to illustrate the outcomes for the
CARA/Gaussian case derived in section 3. The elements of the expected total cost
functions [see (9)-(10)] are specified as follows:
Operating expenses C0 n are represented as the sum of a fixed cost and a variable
cost depending on the size of the BoB:
C0 n = c0 n + K, c0 > 0, K > 0.

(15)

Marketing and selling expenses are assumed to be identical in both periods for the SY
insurer and are specified by:
Cm n = cm ns , cm > 0, s > 2.

(16)

The marketing and selling expenses for the MY insurer are assumed to be allocated
equally to both periods (although they are the same or lower in Period 2) and are
represented as a fraction ν ≤ 1 of an SY insurer for the same BoB. Total marketing and
selling costs for the MY insurer with a BoB of size n equals 2 ν Cm n .
Reinsurance costs vary across periods 1 and 2. For period 1, they are specified in the
form of a linearly increasing loading factor. This implies that reinsurance costs include a
factor that is proportional to the expected value of the reinsurance coverage and a second
factor that increases quadratically as the size L2 (n) - L1 (n) of the reinsurance tranche
covered by the XoL treaty increases. Appendix, Part 3, characterizes the reinsurance
costs facing the insurer.
For the base case the parameters for the total cost function and the reinsurance costs
specified in the Appendix satisfy the stylized assumptions in Table 1 for a multi-line
insurer offering catastrophe coverage:
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Table 1: Assumptions Underlying Calibration for the Base Case
nμ- Re-Payout: Average Annual Loss net of
Reinsurance Payout = 45% of the insurer’s
total cost
C0: Operating/Underwriting Expenses
(excluding marketing), including attritional
losses and loss adjustment expenses = 25% of
the insurer’s total cost
Cm: Marketing and selling Expenses = 15 % of
the insurer’s total cost
Cs: Reinsurance premium = 15% of the
insurer’s total cost
We assume for the base case that capital costs vary by ± 20%. The distribution of risk
aversion in the population of homeowners is assumed to be lognormal with mean and
variance so that 20% of the homeowners choose NI at the base case equilibrium prices.
The number of homeowners was set at N=1000. These assumptions, together with the
calibration benchmarks in Table 1, give rise to the parameters in Table 2 for the base case
corresponding to (15)-(16) and (T11)-(T17) in Appendix. Part 3. Tables 3 and 4 detail the
base case outcomes. The number of homeowners who demand MY policies in period 1 is
580 with the remaining 220 purchasing an SY policy. Demand for SY policies in period 2
increases to 416 if w = d since almost all of the uninsured individuals in period 1 now
decide to purchase coverage. When w = u all the individuals who were NI in period 1 will
remain uninsured in period 2 and those who bought an SY policy in period 1 will decide
not to renew, so there will be no demand for SY policies in period 2.
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Table 2: Base Case Parameter Values
Number of Homeowners  N   dG (a )

N = 1000

A

μA = 0.0011847
σA = 0.00004

G(a) = NGA(a), GA(a) = lognormal(μA ,σA )

μ = 20000, σ = 6000, ρ = 0.5,

μ, σ, ρ, φ, τ, q

φ = 0.5, τ = 100, q = 0.1

C0 n = c0 n + K

c0 = 150, K=265000

SY: Cm n = cm ns , MY:ν Cm n

cm = 235, s = 2.01, ν = 1

Cs1 (n;r1 , ζ) =

Cs2 (n;r2 (w), ζ) =

L2 (n)
L1 (n)
L2 (n)
L1 (n)

λ1 -1+ξ1 x 1-F x, n, ζ dx

λ1 = 1.25, ξ1 = 0.0000036
λ2 d = (1-δ)λ1 , ξ2 d = (1-δ)ξ2

λ2 (w)-1+ξ2 (w)x 1-F x, n, ζ dx λ2 u = (1+δ)λ1 , ξ2 u = (1+δ)ξ2
δ = 0.2

Table 3. Outcomes for the Base Case for the SY Insurer
1st Period

2nd Period w = d

2nd Period w = u

1) Equilibrium prices PS1 , PdS2 , PuS2

40,705

39,530

41,857

2) Size of the BoB n

26.00

27.00

25.00

220

416

0

4) Average Annual Losses

520,000

540,000

500,000

5) Expected Reinsurance Payouts

44,464

46,143

42,786

6) Reinsurance Premium

149,783

127,351

168,780

7) Operating/Underwriting Expenses

268,900

269,050

268,750

8) Marketing and selling Expenses

164,121

177,055

151,680

1,058,340

1,067,314

1,046,424

3) Homeowner Demand for SY
policies

Total Expected Cost per period
(4-5+6+7+8)
Total Expected Cost

2,115,208

Column1+φColumn2 +(1-φ)Column3
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Table 4. Outcomes for the Base Case for the MY Insurer
1st Period

2nd Period w = d

1) Equilibrium price PM

40,705

2) Size of the BoB n

26.00

3) Homeowner Demand for MY
policies

580

4) Average Annual Losses

520,000

5) Expected Reinsurance Payouts

44,464

6) Reinsurance Premium

149,783

119,826

7) Operating/Underwriting Expenses

268,900

8) Marketing and selling Expenses

164,121

Total Expected Cost per period
(4-5+6+7+8)

2nd Period w = u

1,058,340

1,028,383

179,739

1,088,296

Total Expected Cost
Column1+φColumn2 +(1-φ)Column3

2,116,679

As the BoB for the MY insurer is constant over both periods and all states of the
world, the only outcomes that change between periods1 and 2 are the reinsurance
premiums, and hence the Total Expected Cost. Note that the BoB changes for the SY
insurer as a function of the state of the world with a slightly larger (BoB when
reinsurance premium decreases under the state of the world w = d and a slightly lower
BoB when reinsurance premiums increases when w = u. SY insurers choose the optimal
BoB in each state of the world while the MY insurer must choose a constant BoB over
both periods. This gives rise to lower Total Expected Costs over both periods for the SY
insurer relative to the MY insurer since our base case assumes no marketing cost
advantages for the MY insurer (ν = 1). The results for Demand for the base case are
intuitive and follow the logic of Figure 3.
We now consider some comparative results on SY vs MY policies as key parameters
change. It should be noted from Figure 3 that in general neither policy type can be
expected to dominate the other for all homeowners. The equilibrium outcomes will
depend on the distribution of homeowner risk aversion. The more risk averse the
population of homeowners, and the more significant are marketing cost advantages of
MY insurers, the greater the demand for MY policies. Similarly, the greater the perceived
probability q of policy cancellation, and the greater the transactions costs τ of finding a
new insurer, the greater the advantage of MY over SY policies. These general advantages
of MY policies are counterbalanced by the greater flexibility of SY insurers to adjust

20

their BoB in the face of volatility in capital costs and reinsurance premiums. Tables 5-8
illustrate these results.
Table 5 shows the effects of increasing q, homeowners’ belief of the probability of
cancellation at the end of period 1 if they are insured under an SY policy. The effect of
increases in q is to decrease CE(SY1, a) given in (3). With an eye on Figure 3, this
increases H1(a, SY-MY) and increases a(PS1 . Since q has no effect on equilibrium prices
(see the equilibrium conditions (T1)-(T2) in the Appendix), it follows that an increase in
q will decrease SY demand and increase MY demand. The negative impact of an increase
in q on SY demand in period 1 is intuitively clear. An increase in q also has a negative
impact on SY demand in period 2 for the following reason: The cut-off values ad2 , au2 for
SY demand in period 2 are unaffected by q, so that the larger MY demand which is
maintained in both periods, implies a decrease in SY demand.11 Overall, we see that
increases in q will make SY policies less attractive in both periods. The results for
changes in transactions costs τ would be similar.
Table 6 shows the effects of changes in ν, reflecting the magnitude of the marketing
cost advantage of the MY firm. As expected, as this advantage increases (i.e as ν
decreases), price PM decreases and the BoB of the MY firm increases. The result is
increased demand for MY insurance at the expense of both NI and SY demand. In the
case analyzed in Table 6 where marketing costs for MY firms are half those of SY firms
(i.e. ν = 0.5), SY policies are not viable in equilibrium.
Table 7 shows the effects of changes in correlation ρ. As ρ increases, the amount of
reinsurance cover L2(n)-L1(n) increases. The result is that for any fixed BoB, reinsurance
premiums increase. In equilibrium, the optimal BoB decreases. As the SY firm is able to
adjust its BoB in response to the changing state of the world, it is able to respond to the
increased cost of reinsurance better than the MY firm by reducing its BoB in period 2 and
increasing its price. The result is a decrease in demand for MY insurance and an increase
in SY demand. Analogous results hold for the reinsurance volatility parameter δ. In
general, the more costly reinsurance is, and the more volatile reinsurance premiums are
under different states of the world, the larger the advantage of SY firms, relative to MY
firms, in being able to adjust their BoB and prices in period 2.
Finally, Table 8 shows the effects of shifts in the mean risk aversion μA for the
population of homeowners. Neither the functions defining the geometry of Figure 3, nor
the equilibrium prices are affected by μA (see the equilibrium conditions (T1)-(T2) in the
Appendix). Increases in μA increases demand for MY policies relative to both NI and SY
given an increase in preferences for insurance protection and stable prices over time as
homeowners become more risk averse. Indeed, by changing the distribution of
homeowner risk preferences, one can obtain equilibrium outcomes varying from 100%
NI to 100% SY to 100% MY insurance choices (one need only choose a probability
distribution function G(a) with mass centered wholly in the NI, SY or MY region). The
actual outcome for any market will depend on homeowner characteristics.

11

This assumes positive SY demand in period 2.
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5. Conclusions and Future Research
This paper shows that in a competitive insurance market it is feasible and efficient for
insurers to offer both single and multi-year policies given that the degree of risk aversion
will differ between consumers who face a given risk. The proportion of individuals who
choose each of these types of policies or prefer to remain uninsured depends on the
marketing and reinsurance costs incurred by the insurer, the correlation across risks and
the likelihood that an insured individual purchasing an SY policy in period 1 will have it
cancelled because the cost of risk capital increases as a result of catastrophic losses in
period 1. The findings also imply that if insurers only offer one an SY or MY policy, total
demand for coverage will either decrease or stay the same from what it would be if both
types of coverage were offered to homeowners. This is because some individuals would
prefer to be uninsured in a single-policy world but would purchase coverage when more
than one type of policy is offered to them.
Future research on the tradeoffs between SY and MY policies on the demand and
supply side could address the following issues:


Extending the number of periods that an MY policy is offered to determine the
impact this will have on the relative prices of MY and SY policies and the
demand for each type of coverage. If MY policies cannot be canceled, then the
results of the above two period model (i.e. T = 2) can be extended to T > 2 in a
straightforward manner. This requires only that the valuation equations (4)-(6) be
extended to account for the continuing free choice of NI or SY policies for T >2.
The state-dependent prices of an SY policy would be determined as in the twoperiod model and would depend on the state-dependent reinsurance price in each
period. A simple model for reinsurance prices for a T-period problem would be a
generalization of the binary up-down model for the two-period problem with
reinsurance prices increasing or decreasing with fixed probabilities. Insurers and
homeowners make decisions with respect to an SY policy in a highly myopic
manner because they both know they have the freedom to change their decisions
in the next period.
In extending the two-period model to T > 2, the decisions by the insurer and the
consumer with respect to an MY policy would be affected by the expected
evolution of reinsurance prices in all periods as well as the probability of a policy
being canceled at the end of any period t <T (i.e. q), the costs of searching for a
new policy should it be cancelled (i.e. τ ), and other determinants of the average
insurance cost [e.g. marketing costs, correlation of risks between individuals (ρ)].



Incorporating the possibility of individuals investing in mitigation measures to
reduce their losses where there is an upfront cost associated with the measure but
the benefits of mitigation accrue over a number of periods. An insurer offering an
MY policy can guarantee a premium reduction for each of the periods the policy
is in place. If an individual purchases an SY policy, then she may be uncertain as
to whether another insurer will give her the same premium discount should her
current insurer cancel her policy.
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Examining the impact of structural changes in the risk over time on the premiums
that insurers would need to charge for MY policies relative to SY policies as the
number of periods the policy is offered increases. These issues are relevant when
examining the impact of climate change and the possibility of global warming on
future losses from natural disasters such as hurricanes and flooding.

More generally, this paper should be viewed as a first step in exploring the challenges
and opportunities that multi-year contracts can play in providing protection against fattailed risks. We have used a competitive market environment with perfect information by
both parties to provide a benchmark case for addressing these issues. A number of other
issues could be explored related to real-world constraints such as enforcement of
contracts and uncertainties associated with the risks coupled with behavioral models of
insurer and consumer behavior.
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Table 5. Outcomes as Cancellation Probability q Varies
SY Outcomes
q = 0.1
Average Equilibrium Price =
Average Expected
Cost=

P1 +φPd2 +(1-φ)Pu2

n1 +φnd2 +(1-φ)nu2

q = 0.2

40,699

40,699

40,705

40,705

26.00

26.00

26.00

26.00

220

207

580

586

520,000

520,000

520,000 520,000

44,464

44,464

44,464

148,924

148,924

149,783 149,783

268,900

268,900

268,900 268,900

164,244

164,244

164,121 164,121

2

Average Homeowner Demand
=

q = 0.1

2

Average Size of the BoB
=

q = 0.2

MY Outcomes

D1 +φDd2 +(1-φ)Du2
2

Average Annual Losses
n1 +φnd2 +(1-φ)nu2
=μ
2
Average Expected Reinsurance
Payouts (See App. (T13)-(T14) )
Payout1 +φPayoutd2 +(1-φ)Payoutu2
=
2
Average Reinsurance Premium
(See App. (T15)-(T16) )
Prem1 +φPremd2 +(1-φ)Premu2
=
2
Average Operating/Underwriting
Expenses
C01 +φCd02 +(1-φ)Cu02
=
2
Average Marketing and selling
Expenses (multiply by ν for MY)
Cm1 +φCdm2 +(1-φ)Cum2
=
2
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44,464

Table 6. Outcomes as MY Marketing Costs Factor ν Varies
SY Outcomes
ν = 0.5
Average Equilibrium Price =
Average Expected
Cost=

P1 +φPd2 +(1-φ)Pu2

n1 +φnd2 +(1-φ)nu2

ν=1

40,699

40,699

37,192

40,705

26.00

26.00

32.00

26.00

0

220

1,000

580

520,000

520,000

640,000

520,000

44,464

44,464

54,535

44,464

148,924

148,924

210,312

149,783

268,900

268,900

268,900

268,900

164,244

164,244

249,126

164,121

2

Average Homeowner Demand
=

ν = 0.5

2

Average Size of the BoB
=

ν=1

MY Outcomes

D1 +φDd2 +(1-φ)Du2
2

Average Annual Losses
n1 +φnd2 +(1-φ)nu2
=μ
2
Average Expected Reinsurance
Payouts (See App. (T13)-(T14) )
Payout1 +φPayoutd2 +(1-φ)Payoutu2
=
2
Average Reinsurance Premium (See
App. (T15)-(T16) )
Prem1 +φPremd2 +(1-φ)Premu2
=
2
Average Operating/Underwriting
Expenses
C01 +φCd02 +(1-φ)Cu02
=
2
Average Marketing and selling
Expenses (multiply by ν for MY)
Cm1 +φCdm2 +(1-φ)Cum2
=
2
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Table 7. Outcomes as Correlation ρ Varies
SY Outcomes
ρ = 0.5
Average Equilibrium Price =
Average Expected
Cost=

P1 +φPd2 +(1-φ)Pu2

n1 +φnd2 +(1-φ)nu2

ρ = 0.8

40,699

41,812

40,705

41,822

26.00

25.00

26.00

25.00

220

279

580

90

520,000

500,000

520,000

500,000

44,464

53,334

44,464

53,334

148,924

177,377

149,783

178,445

268,900

268,750

268,900

268,750

164,244

151,803

164,121

151,680

2

Average Homeowner Demand
=

ρ = 0.5

2

Average Size of the BoB
=

ρ = 0.8

MY Outcomes

D1 +φDd2 +(1-φ)Du2
2

Average Annual Losses
n1 +φnd2 +(1-φ)nu2
=μ
2
Average Expected Reinsurance
Payouts (See App. (T13)-(T14) )
Payout1 +φPayoutd2 +(1-φ)Payoutu2
=
2
Average Reinsurance Premium (See
App. (T15)-(T16) )
Prem1 +φPremd2 +(1-φ)Premu2
=
2
Average Operating/Underwriting
Expenses
C01 +φCd02 +(1-φ)Cu02
=
2
Average Marketing and selling
Expenses (multiply by ν for MY)
Cm1 +φCdm2 +(1-φ)Cum2
=
2
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Table 8. Outcomes as Mean Homeowner Risk Aversion μA Varies
SY Outcomes
μA = 0.0011847

Average Equilibrium Price =
Average Expected
Cost=

P1 +φPd2 +(1-φ)Pu2

n1 +φnd2 +(1-φ)nu2

μA = 0.0012

40,699

40,699

40,705

40,705

26

26

26

26

220

154

580

722

520,000

520,000

520,000

520,000

44,464

44,464

44,464

44,464

148,924

148,924

149,783

149,783

268,900

268,900

268,900

268,900

164,244

164,244

164,121

164,121

2

Average Homeowner Demand
=

μA = 0.0011847

2

Average Size of the BoB
=

μA = 0.0012

MY Outcomes

D1 +φDd2 +(1-φ)Du2
2

Average Annual Losses
n1 +φnd2 +(1-φ)nu2
=μ
2
Average Expected Reinsurance
Payouts (See App. (T13)-(T14) )
Payout1 +φPayoutd2 +(1-φ)Payoutu2
=
2
Average Reinsurance Premium (See
App. (T15)-(T16) )
Prem1 +φPremd2 +(1-φ)Premu2
=
2
Average Operating/Underwriting
Expenses
C01 +φCd02 +(1-φ)Cu02
=
2
Average Marketing and selling
Expenses (multiply by ν for MY)
Cm1 +φCdm2 +(1-φ)Cum2
=
2
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Appendix
1. Average Insurer Costs and Prices in a Competitive Market
Competitive equilibrium in both the SY and MY markets occurs where insurers of
each type select a BoB that minimizes their average cost, with price given by the
minimum of the respective average cost curve. Thus, from (9), and noting that prices in
the SY market are set after the state of the world w ∈ d, u is known, we have :
PS1 = Minn≥0

CSY n;r1 , ζ
CSY n;r2 (w) ,ζ
; Pw
, w ∈ d, u
S2 = Minn≥0
n
n

(T1)

with the optimal BoBs for the SY insurer being the corresponding solutions, nS1 , ndS2 , nuS2 ,
to the indicated average cost minimization problems, where r and r2 (w) are reinsurance
costs in periods 1 and 2, the latter being state dependent.
Similarly, from (10), the equilibrium price in the MY market is determined by the
minimum of the total average cost for the two periods, so that:
2PM = Minn≥0 {

CMY n; r1 , ζ +φCMY n; r2 d , ζ + 1-φ CMY n; r2 u , ζ
}
n

(T2)

with the optimal BoB for the MY insurer being the corresponding solution nMY to (T2).
Note that, for all n, CMY n; r2 d , ζ
CMY n; r1 , ζ
CMY n; r2 u , ζ , so that average
d
u
costs also satisfy: ACM2 < ACM1 < ACM2 and therefore ACdM2 < PM < ACuM2 , verifying the
need for imposing a cancelation fee ψ PM -Pds2 -τ to assure expected breakeven
operations for the MY insurer in period 2.
Given our assumptions a competitive equilibrium exists for both the SY and MY
markets yielding the price vector {PM , PS1 , PdS2 , PuS2 } and the BoB vector
{nM , nS1 , ndS2 , nuS2 }. Some of these markets may be degenerate in the sense that there is no
demand for one or other of these policies at the equilibrium prices. The assumptions on
average costs imply a number of intuitively appealing results for the comparative statics
of equilibrium prices and BoBs for both MY and SY insurers. For example, since
reinsurance costs in period 2 increase or decrease relative to period 1 depending on the
state of the world, equilibrium prices in the SaY market satisfy: PdS2 < PS1 < PuS2 and the
corresponding optimal BoBs satisfy: ndS2 > nS1 > nuS2 . Comparative statics with respect to
the parameters in ζ = (μ, σ, ρ, γ* , φ, q, τ) can be derived using (9) and (10) together with
(A3) and (A4) for SY and MY equilibrium prices. Due to the assumption with respect to
average reinsurance costs equilibrium prices increase and equilibrium BoBs decrease as ρ
increases for both SY and MY insurers.
We record here one general comparative result between SY and MY policies.
Suppose there are no marketing cost advantages for MY insurers (ν = 1 in (10)). Then the
equilibrium price vector {PM , PS1 , PdS2 , PuS2 } satisfies12: PM ≥ PS1 + φPdS2 + (1-φ) PuS2 . In
12

This follows from (T1) - (T2) since ν = 1 implies CSY = CMY and from the fact that for any real valued
functions f, g, h, the following inequality is evidently true:
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particular, a risk neutral homeowner would always prefer SY policies to MY policies
when ν = 1 and when there are no transactions costs for the homeowner from policy
cancellation (τ = 0). Of course, even when τ = 0, risk averse homeowners might still
prefer MY policies to avoid the risk of price volatility in period 2. Nonetheless, the above
inequality expresses clearly one advantage of SY policies, namely the ability to adjust the
BoB in the face of changing reinsurance costs.
2. Proofs of the CARA/Gaussian Case
This part of the appendix provides proofs of the basic properties of the
CARA/Gaussian case shown in Figure 3. We assume a fixed parameter vector
ζ = (μ, σ, ρ, γ* , φ, q, τ) and a price vector P = {PM , PS1 , PdS2 , PuS2 }. To avoid special cases
we assume that σ > τ ≥ 0 so that the uncertainty associated with the hazard is larger than
the transactions costs of finding a new policy if the policy is cancelled.
Claim 1: The solution a(PS1 ) in (12) is unique
Proof: Consider the function arising from (12) defined as:
1

1

2

a

g(a) = μ+ aσ2 - log L(a, ζ) eaPS1 where L(a, ζ) = qeaτ +(1-q).

(T3)

To establish the claim, it suffices to show that the following properties for the function
1
h(a) = ag(a) = aμ+ a2 σ2 - log L(a, ζ) eaPS1 .
2

P1: h(0) = 0; h' 0 = μ-(PS1 +qτ);
P2: h(a) > 0 for a > a =

2(P + τ - μ)
σ2

;

P3: h''(a) > 0 (i.e., h is strictly convex for a > 0).
Assume P1-P3. Then h(0) = 0 and h'(0) < 0. Since, by P1, h(a) > 0 for a sufficiently
large (viz., for a > a), it must be that the continuous function h(a) has a minimum in the
interval [0, a]. However, given P3, this minimum is unique and (again by P3) the value “a”
at which h(a) crosses zero is also unique. We need therefore only show that P1-P3 hold
(under the assumptions that σ > τ ≥ 0).
P1 is obvious from direct calculation. P2 follows by noting that log( ) is monotonic
increasing and eaτ > 1, so that
ln [qeaτ +(1-q)] < ln (eaτ ) = aτ.

(T4)

Thus, for a > a, we have
1

1

2

2

h(a) = ag(a) > a(μ+ aσ2 -P-τ) > a(μ+ aσ2 -P-τ) = 0.
Concerning P3, it can be calculated that

Min{f(x)+φg(x)+(1-φ)h(x)|x≥0} ≥ Min{f(x) |x≥0}+φMin{g(x) |x≥0}+(1-φ)Min{h(x) |x≥0}
assuming that all relevant minima exist.
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(T5)




qe a
1
h ' ' (a )   2  (1  q ) 2  a
  a
.
 qe  (1  q )   qe  (1  q ) 

(T6)

Both fractions in (T6) are clearly < 1. Thus, since σ > τ ≥ 0,
h ''(a)  2  (1  q)2  2  2  0 , completing the proof of Claim 1.
For the next claim, we need the following property of CARA risk preferences: Let Y
be any random variable with positive variance. The Certainty Equivalent CE(Y, a) under
CARA preferences is decreasing in “a”. This follows directly from Theorem 1 of Pratt
(1964).
Claim 2: The functions H1 a, NI-MY , H1 a, SY-MY are increasing in a ∈ A.
Proof: Consider H1 a, NI-MY . Divide both sides of (13) by 2. Then, Claim 2 is
equivalent to the assertion that the solution PM to the following equation is increasing in
a ∈ A:
U -PM , a = 0.5U CE NI, a , a + 0.5φMax[U(-PdS2 , a),U(CE NI, a , a)]
u

+ 0.5 1-φ Max[U(-PS2 , a),U(CE(NI, a), a)].

(T7)

With an eye on (12), there are three relevant intervals in A associated with (T7):
0 < a < ad2 : ad2 ≤ a < au2 : au2 ≤ a. Observe first that the solution PM (a) = H1 a, NI-MY to
log[-K(a)]

(T7) is unique and continuous (since the solution to U -PM ,a =K(a) is PM =
).
a
Thus, it suffices to show the Claim for each of the three relevant intervals separately.
Consider the first interval, 0 < a < ad2 . In this interval, NI is always superior to SY in
period 2, so that (T7) can be expressed as
U -PM , a = 0.5E{U( X1 , a)} + 0.5φE{U( X2 , a)} + 0.5(1-φ)E{U( X2 , a)}

(T8)

where X1 , X2 are the loss distributions for periods 1 and 2 respectively. We see that the
rhs of (T8) is the expected utility of the random variable which yields X1 with probability
0.5, and X2 with probability 0.5. The solution PM to (T8) is clearly just the negative of the
CE of this random variable, so that Pratt’s result cited above, establishes the claim for
this interval.
Consider the second interval ad2 ≤ a < au2 . In this interval, SY is always superior to NI
in period 2, when w = d and inferior to NI when w = u, so that (T7) can be expressed as
U -PM ,a = 0.5E{U( X1 , a)} + 0.5φU(-PdS2 , a) + 0.5(1-φ)E{U( X2 , a)}.

(T9)

From (T9) PM is the negative of the CE of the random variable equal to X1 with
d

probability 0.5, -PS2 with probability 0.5φ, and X2 with probability 0.5(1-φ). Pratt’s result
implies that PM is increasing in “a”.
Finally, consider the interval au2 ≤ a, for which SY is superior to NI for all states of
the world w ∈ {u, d}. In this case, (T7) is equivalent to
U -PM , a = 0.5E{U( X1 , a)} + 0.5φU(-PdS2 , a) + 0.5(1-φ)5φU(-PuS2 , a).

32

(T10)

Following the same logic as above establishes the claim for this interval.
Thus, H1 a, NI-MY is strictly increasing in “a” as asserted in Claim 2.
A similar argument establishes Claim 2 for H1 a, SY-MY .
We finally note that H1 a, NI-MY < H1 a, SY-MY for “a” sufficiently small since
from (T8) H1 a, NI-MY → μ as a → 0, whereas H1 a, SY-MY > μ since the price PM
that would make a homeowner indifferent between an MY and SY policy is certainly no
lower than the lowest SY policy price PdS2 , which is clearly greater than the mean of the
loss distribution μ. We see, therefore, that H1 a, NI-MY is below H1 a, SY-MY for “a”
small. On the other hand, as explained in the text, H1 a, NI-MY and H1 a, SY-MY
have a unique intersection at a = a(PS1 ). As both functions are monotonic increasing, it
must be that H1 a, NI-MY > H1 a, SY-MY for a > a(PS1 ). These facts establish the
basic geometry of Figure 3.
3. Reinsurance Costs for the CARA/Gaussian Case
Reinsurance costs in period 1 for the CARA/Gaussian case are given by:
L2 (n)

Cs1 (n;r1 , ζ) =

L1 (n)

λ1 -1+ξ1 x 1-F x, n, ζ dx

(T11)

where r1 = (λ1 , ξ1 ) with λ1 > 1, ξ1 > 0, and where F(x, n, ζ) is the cdf of the normal
distribution with mean nμ and variance σ2 [n+n n-1 ρ] corresponding to the loss
distribution X n = ∑ni=1 X(ai ) for a BoB of size n.
Period 2 reinsurance costs are state dependent and are given by:
L2 (n)

Cs2 (n;r2 (w), ζ) =

L1 (n)

λ2 (w)-1+ξ2 (w)x 1-F x, n, ζ dx.

(T12)

The reinsurance costs (T11) and (T12) are net of expected reinsurance payments (this
is the effect of subtracting 1 from the respective loading factors, λ1 and λ2 (w), in the first
term under the integral). Thus, the total expected reinsurance payouts and premiums for
this XoL treaty are given in a standard linearly increasing loading factor form by:
Payouts1 (n;r1 , ζ) =

L2 (n)

1-F x, n, ζ dx;

(T13)

L1 (n)

Payouts2 (n;r2 (w), ζ) =
Premiums1 (n;r1 , ζ) =

L2 (n)

1-F x, n, ζ dx;

(T14)

L1 (n)
L2 (n)
L1 (n)

Premiums2 (n;r2 (w), ζ) =

λ1 +ξ1 x 1-F x, n, ζ dx;

L2 (n)
L1 (n)

λ2 (w)+ξ2 (w)x 1-F x, n, ζ dx;
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(T15)
(T16)

where r2 (w)= (λ2 (w), ξ2 (w)) with λ2 (w) > 1, ξ2 (w) > 0, w ∈ {d, u}.
In line with our assumption that the state d (respectively u) represents a decrease
(respectively increase) in capital cost relative to period 1, we assume:
λ2 (d) ≤ λ1 ≤ λ2 (u); ξ2 (d) ≤ ξ1 ≤ ξ2 (u).

(T17)

Note that the cdf F(x, n, ζ) is identical in both periods, since we assume that the hazard
distribution is identical in both periods (of course the BoB may change for the SY insurer
between periods 1 and 2). For the same reason, for any fixed BoB of size n, the
attachment points L1 (n), L2 (n) are also unchanged between periods 1 and 2.
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